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THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

STEVEN JAY DOOLITTLE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.
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:

INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse Steven Jay Doolittle's
(Doolittle) convictions because the trial court abused its discretion by sending Linda
Leonhardt's (Leonhardt) written statement into the jury room during deliberation and the
trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENDING THE WRITTEN STATEMENT
INTO THE JURY ROOM DURING DELIBERATION
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse because: (A) Doolittle
properly preserved his argument for appeal, (B) the trial court abused its discretion by
sending Leonhardt's written statement into the jury room during deliberations, and (C)
the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial.
A.

Doolittle Properly Preserved His Argument For Appeal.
The preservation requirement exists because f'the trial court ought to be given an

opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and "a defendant
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing]
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming] on
appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Hoi gate. 2000 UT 74^11, 10 P.3d 346
(quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Accordingly, an issue is
properly preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on the issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125,
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted); Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT
App 239,^[26, 8 P.3d 281 (holding "party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is
brought 'to a "level of consciousness"'" (citations omitted)); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d
769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection timely because he "met the
requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial
court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)).
Here, contrary to the State's argument, Doolittle's argument is preserved because
both policy reasons for the preservation requirement are met. First, the trial court had an
opportunity to correct its error. Doolittle specifically objected to the written statement
being "published to the jury." R. 92:77-78. He argued neither the rules of evidence nor
case law indicate "that th[e] actual statement from the witness or memorandum from the
witness that was relied upon at the trial was ever admitted." Id. at 152-53. He also
explained that publishing a written statement to the jury "over-emphasizes that statement

2

as being more important than anything else the jury heard in terms of testimony because
they have it memorialized; whereas, every other piece of testimony is in their head.11 Id, at
155. This argument alerted both the trial court and the State to the dangers of allowing
written testimony to enter jury deliberations.1 Id 155-56. In fact, the State agreed with
Doolittle's argument and said it had "no objection to the Court retrieving [the written
statement] from the jurors and telling them that they must rely upon their own
recollections regarding when that was read to the jury." Id. at 155. The trial court,
however, rejected Doolittle's argument and suggested any error in allowing the written
statement into jury deliberations could be corrected by "appellate court review." Id. at
156. Second, Doolittle did not forego objecting to enhance his chances of acquittal.
Doolittle objected to the written statement five times. Id. at 28, 29-30, 42, 77-78, 151-55.
He made very clear to the trial court and opposing counsel that he did not believe the
witness statement should be admitted into evidence or taken into the jury room. Id.

1

The fact that Doolittle never mentioned rule 17(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure is irrelevant. See Aple. Br. at 7, 14-15. Rule 17(1) says, "Upon retiring for
deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits
which have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of
the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons, or
contraband." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(1). According to the advisory note, rule 17(1) makes
no reference to depositions because written testimony is "not evidence" and should not
be treated as such. Utah R. Crim. P. 17(1) Advisory Committee Note. Rather, as
explained by Doolittle in his objection at trial and in his opening brief to this Court, the
rule that written testimony should not accompany the jury into deliberation originated at
common law and is protected today through case law and court rules. See Aplt. Br. at
12-14; R. 92:152-55.
3

Thus, this Court should reach Doolittle's argument and should not apply a plain
error analysis because Doolittle properly preserved his argument for appeal. See. Holgate,
2000 UT 74 at Tf 11 ("To serve these policies, we have held that the preservation rule
applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred.").
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Sending the Written Statement
With the Jury Into Deliberation.
First, the State argues this Court should consider rule 801(d)(1) of the Utah Rules

of Evidence as a possible alternative ground for affirmance. See Aple. Br. at 16-17, 17 n.
6. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 4if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action."' State v. Topanotes. 2003 UT 30,^9, 76 P.3d 1159 (citations omitted).
"However, not only must the alternative ground be apparent on the record, it must also be
sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court."2 Id.
Here, the trial court's findings do not sustain a ruling under rule 801(d)(1). The
trial court found "Exhibit 1 was read in its entirety into the record and then it was moved

2

The State cites State v. Tueller. 2001 UT App 317, 37 P.3d 1180, and State v.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), to argue this Court should consider rule
801(d)(1) as an alternative ground for affirmance. Aple. Br. at 16-17. This Court should
not follow these cases, however, because they were decided before Topanotes and do not
address Topanotes' requirement that the alternative ground "be sustainable by the factual
findings of the trial court." Topanotes. 2003 UT 30 at ^[9.
4

for admission and the Court granted the motion and permitted the exhibit to be published.
And the footnote to [rule 803(5)] says that it's been done previously with the Court's
blessing. So it is received." R. 92:121. The trial court also found the witness unavailable
under rule 804(a)(3) because she testified "to a lack of recollection on the written
statement." Id at 74. These findings do not satisfy rule 801(d)(1). I&_ Specifically, they
do not establish whether Leonhardt testified at trial and was "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement," whether the statement was "inconsistent with" Leonhardt's
testimony or Leonhardt "deni[ed] having made the statement or h[ad] forgotten." Utah R.
Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). They also do not establish, as required by rule 613(b) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, that Leonhardt was "afforded an opportunity to explain or deny" the
statement and Doolittle was "afforded an opportunity to interrogate" Leonhardt thereon,
or that "the interests of justice otherwise require[d].'" Tueller, 2001 UT App 317 at ^[24
(quoting Utah R. Evid. 613(b)) (explaining that, before admitting prior inconsistent
statement, trial court must "assure" rule 613(b) is met). In fact, although the trial court
was given the opportunity to make rule 613(b) findings, it chose not to. R. 76-78.
Besides, even if rule 801(d)(1) was properly presented as an alternative ground for
affirmance, this Court should still reverse because applying rule 801(d)(1) does not cure
the trial court's error. The State argues rule 801(d)(1) has no "limitations" on allowing
written statements "into the jury room," therefore, it must allow written statements into the
jury room. Aple. Br. at 17. This argument, however, is contradicted by the common law,
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case law, and other court rules. State v. Carter. 888 P.2d 629, 642 (Utah 1994), cert,
denied. 516 U.S. 858 (1995) (explaining rule that written testimony "should not be
admitted into evidence as an exhibit, nor should it be taken into the jury room during
deliberation" is "supported by [Utah's] own case law, as well as the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure"); State v. Solomon. 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 1939)
(explaining rule against allowing written testimony into jury room was "always" followed
by common law); State v. Wilson. 360 P.2d 1092, 1098 (Kan. 1961) (holding trial court
erred because "action of the trial court in sending the transcript of the evidence to the jury
appears to be without precedent"); Schmunk v. State. 714 P.2d 724, 744 (Wyo. 1986)
("The rule against sending testimony to the jury room is as ancient as the common law
itself."); Commonwealth v. Ware. 20 A. 806, 808 (Pa. 1890) (holding the "sending out of
a part of the testimony to the jury room is without precedent, and would have been a
palpable error").
Moreover, the State has cited no case law to support its assertion. Although the
State cites Taylor, it admits Taylor is irrelevant. Aple. Br. at 17. In Taylor, the defendant
did not argue and this Court did not consider whether the trial court erred by allowing
written statements into deliberation. See Taylor. 818 P.2d at 572 (noting defendant
argues parts of the written statements "contained irrelevant and highly prejudicial matters
which should have been masked from the jury"). In fact, there is not even any suggestion
the written statements entered the jury room. See id.

6

Second, the State argues the trial court did not err by allowing the written statement
into the jury room because the handwriting had "special relevance to the issue of
[Leonhardt's] emotional state at the time." Aple. Br. at 17. Regardless of the
handwriting's possible relevance, however, the written statement was testimony that
entered the jury room and continued pleading the prosecution's case throughout
deliberation. See Carter, 888 P.2d at 642-43 (explaining written testimony is excluded
from jury deliberation because "[i]f some evidence is admitted in oral form only, while
other evidence is first read and then delivered to the jury in writing, 'it is obvious that the
side sustained by written evidence is given an undue advantage'" (citations omitted));
Stidem v. State, 272 S.E.2d 338, 340 (Ga. 1980) ("All writings introduced in evidence in
lieu of testimony from the witness stand, such as interrogatories, depositions, dying
declarations, and confessions of guilt of a defendant or of an alleged coconspirator, which
depend entirely for their value on the credibility of the maker, should not be in the
possession of the jury during their deliberations." (quotations and citation omitted)). If
the handwriting held special significance, the trial court should have placed the
handwriting before the jury without sending testimony into the jury room during
deliberations.3 See State v. Tammetta, 624 So. 2d 433, 434 (La. Ct. App. 1993)

3

At the very least, the trial court should have taken precautions to ensure the jury
did not over-emphasize the written statement. See. United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d
1403, 1408-09 (9 th Cir. 1994) (reversing because precaution of providing "jury with both
the direct and cross-examination of [witness's] testimony,... was insufficient to prevent
undue emphasis").
7

(reversing because prejudicial error to send witness's "written statements" in to the jury
room during deliberation); State v. Marquett. 27 P.3d 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
("While the transcript testimony here is different in form than videotaped testimony . . . ,
both are testimonial evidence."); Schmunk. 714 P.2d at 744 (Wyo. 1986) (holding
videotaped confession subject to "rule against sending testimony to the jury room"). In
fact, the State itself agreed the written statement was not needed in the jury room to
establish the handwriting's possible relevance. R. 92:155-56. Rather, the State
explained, publishing the statement during trial was sufficient to establish any relevance
and it had "no objection to the Court retrieving [the written statement] from the jury." Id.
Further, more important than the alleged significance of the handwriting is the
definite significance of Leonhardt's demeanor while testifying. See State v. Kent, 20
Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 72 n. 6 (Utah 1967) (holding juror permitted to "scrutinize[] the
witnesses," "note[] their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand," and place "his
reliance on those whom he believes to be telling the truth" (quotations and citation
omitted) (emphasis in original)). By sending the written statement into the jury room, the
trial court allowed the jury to decide which version of Leonhardt's testimony to believe
without considering her demeanor, mannerisms, or candor. See Shaffer v. State, 449
N.E.2d 1074, 1076 (Ind. 1983) (reversing trial court's decision to allow jury to hear
audiotapes of testimony during deliberations because "[w]hen the jurors recommenced
deliberations, they did so equipped with only the substantive testimony and lacking the
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facial gestures (demeanor), the manner in which the witnesses answered the questions, the
mannerisms, and the candor or lack thereof, of the key witnesses" (citations omitted)).
C.

This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion
Was Prejudicial.
First, the State argues Doolittle was not prejudiced because our "Supreme Court

and other courts have consistently recognized that exhibits or other evidence erroneously
admitted are harmless if, as here, they contain only evidence that the jury has already
properly heard." Aple. Br. at 19-20 (citations omitted).4 This argument ignores Solomon.
where our supreme court held the presence of a transcript injury deliberation required
reversal because it was "error to permit any part of the transcript used in impeaching the

4

To support this argument, the State cites Carter. Aple. Br. at 20. In Carter, our
supreme court held sending an abstract of witness testimony into the jury room was
harmless error because the "dramatic impact" of the transcript came from reading it "into
the record," and its admission into deliberation actually mitigated the impact by
"provid[ing] the jury with complete access to [defendant's] original counsel's full crossexamination and any other evidence in mitigation" that was "not previously read into the
record." Carter, 888 P.2d at 643-44. As explained in Doolittle's opening brief, Carter is
distinguishable because the prejudicial nature of sending the written statement into jury
deliberation in this case was not mitigated by the presence of new exculpatory evidence
in the statement. See Aplt. Br. at 19. Rather, the witness statement contradicted
Leonhardt's exonerating testimony and provided the only direct evidence of Doolittle's
guilt. See id. The other cases cited by the State are irrelevant. See State v. Kell, 2002
UT 106, 61 P.3d 1019 (defendant did not argue trial court erred by allowing written
statement injury room); State v. Thomas. 777 P.2d 445,450 (Utah 1989) (challenged
evidence was not sent into jury deliberation); Engebretsen v. Hartford Insurance Co., 21
F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 1994) (defendant did not argue trial court erred by allowing written
statement injury room); United States v. Juarez. 549 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1977) (no
suggestion written statement went into jury room and, even if it did, defendant did not
argue error).
9

witnesses to be taken to the jury room in writing." Solomon, 87 P.2d at 811.
Besides, Doolittle does not argue he was prejudiced when the jury heard the
witness statement, but when the jury was allowed to take the witness statement into
deliberations for further perusal and consideration. This placed undue emphasis on the
State's evidence. See Wilson, 360 P.2d at 1098 (holding trial court's error in sending
transcript of alleged victim's testimony into jury deliberation was prejudicial because
transcript "placed undue emphasis on [victim's] testimony; in fact, it was equivalent to
sending the complaining witness into the jury room, where she continued to plead her
cause"). Specifically, it allowed the jury to consider the State's evidence verbatim and
implied the written version of Leonhardt's testimony was more reliable than her in-court,
under-oath testimony. See Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 744 ("Having some testimony to read
again and consider and discuss in deliberations, the jury is likely to unduly emphasize that
testimony over that which was heard days before and which may have begun to fade from
memory."); Commonwealth v. Canales. 311 A.2d 572, 575 (Pa. 1973) (holding "the
presence in the jury room of the physical embodiment of a portion of the trial testimony in
written form may have the effect of increasing the probability that the jury will accept that
testimony as credible"); Pavne v. State. 227 N.W. 258, 263 (Wise. 1929) (holding "it is
obvious that to permit a jury to take the written portion of the testimony to the jury room,
compelling them to rely upon their memories for the testimony on the other side, gives
one side of the controversy an undue advantage"). Absent this inappropriate emphasis,
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there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would not have convicted Doolittle. See Wilson,
360 P.2d at 1098 (holding prejudicial error to send victim's testimony into jury room
because "placed undue emphasis on her testimony; in fact, it was equivalent to sending
the complaining witness into the jury room, where she continued to plead her cause").
Second, the State argues Doolittle was not prejudiced because "the jury could have
reasonably inferred [he] was guilty, even without [Leonhardt]'s hand-written statement."
Aple. Br. at 20. However, the test is not whether the jury could have reasonably inferred
guilt, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. See State v.
Adams, 2000 UT 42,TJ20, 5 P.3d 642 (holding error is prejudicial if "likelihood of a
different outcome [in the absence of the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to undermine
confidence in the verdict" (alterations in original) (quotations and citation omitted)); State
v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) ("The reasonable likelihood question is not
just the substantial evidence test in disguise; rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the
error. If the taint is sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to
support a verdict."). Absent the undue emphasis on Leonhardt's written statement, there
was a reasonable likelihood the jury would have found her in-court testimony more
credible or rejected all her statements as not credible. See. Aplt. Br. at 16-20. This would
have left Officer Burke's testimony that he could not identify Doolittle as the driver of the
car or the person he spoke to on the telephone as the only evidence of guilt. See id. Thus,
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would not have found sufficient evidence to
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convict Doolittle. See id.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Doolittle's convictions because the trial court abused its
discretion by sending the written statement into the jury room during deliberation.

SUBMITTED this 4 7 * day of May, 2004.

LORI J. SEPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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